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NOTES

of a threat to the mortgagee or judgment creditor at foreclosure sale. As
the "pay off' tends to defeat that purpose of the statute, it cannot be
upheld.
The right of redemption is purely statutory, "and cannot be
defeated by the court in the foreclosure
enlarged, abridged or
24
decree or otherwise."
However admirable the "pay off" might be, we must necessarily conclude that legislation is the only means by which it can be implemented.
As we have seen, statutory redemption in its present accepted form is
grossly inadequate as a deterrent to sacrifice sales. It can only be hoped
that when new statutes are passed, the legislatures of the different states
will recognize the value of the "pay off" and make it a part of the law.
H. W.

DEL MONTE

THE UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT AND ITS EFFECT
ON JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY
Under the common law when two or more persons perish in a common disaster or under circumstances which make it impossible to determine
the sequence of death, there is no presumption as to survivorship and
anyone claiming property through one of the victims whose ownership
depended on his surviving the other victims, has the burden of proving
such survivorship. If this party cannot sustain the burden of proof, his
claim fails.' To correct the difficulties of the common law rule, some
states enacted statutes providing a presumption of survivorship based upon
age and sex. Such a statute exists in Wyoming2 but those portions in
conflict with the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act are no longer effective. 3
A problem then arises concerning estate planning. What provisions should
a husband and wife make in their wills to cover the possibility of simultaneous death? Under the former statute 4 one could utilize the presumption for estate planning purposes.
One of the problems which arises in estate planning under the Act
is how to have all of the property of husband and wife in one estate if both
perish simultaneously. One reason for having all property in one estate
is to minimize administration and probate costs. While it is also important
to have all of the property in one estate, usually that of the wife, for
purposes of utilizing the marital deduction, that subject is covered in the
Internal Revenue regulations which state:
23.
24.

140 Ill. 170, 29 N.E. 563. 565 (1892).
Ulhich v. Lincoln Realty Co., 180 Ore. 380, 168 P.2d 582, 587
3 Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure, 5th Ed., 1665, § 1062.

1.

Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, 21 At. 64 (1891).

2.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-189 (1957).

3.
4.

§ 9, ch. 94, Laws 1941.
Wyo. Stat. § 1-189 (1957).

(1946),

quoting
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If the order of death of the decendent and his

spouse cannot be establishcd by proof, a presumption (whether
supplied by local law, the tecedent's will, or otherwise) will be
recognized.5
Since many hubsands and wives hold much of their property jointly
or by the entireties, this article will be concerned primarly with the
peculiar problems of joint ownership. On this point the Act provides:
X'Vhere there is no sufficient evidence that two joint tenants or
tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously
the property so held shall be distributed one-half as if one had
survivec/and one-half as if the other had survived. 6
It will be readily seen that this provision of the Act defeats the purposes
stated above. However, another section of the Act provides:
This act shall not apply in the case of wills, living trusts, deeds,
or contracts of insurance wherein provision has been made for
distribution of property different from the provisions of this act.7
Therefore the problem is to provide an estate plan which would place the
estate of the husband and wife within this exclusion thereby allowing a
plan which includes.all of the property within one estate.
That courts will give effect to a presumption of survivorship in a will
is well established.s It can be argued that the above mentioned section
of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act embraces such a presumption
clause. However, it must be borne in mind that the usual presumption
of survivorship clause has reference only to property passing by the will
and not to jointly owned property. After a discussion of the law as it
relates to property passing under the will, an attempt will be made to show
how it can relate to joint property under the Act. Aside from the Act
as it appears in Wyoming statutes, the Act as amended in August, 1953,
provides:
...or where provisions made for a presumption as to survivorship
which results in a distribution of property different from that
here provided. 9
The comment following the Act as amended appearing in Handbook of the
National Co-nference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws states:
The committee are of the opinion that the courts would construe
the original act the same as the act as here re-written, if they adopt
a liberal construction, but the amendment may clarify and be
helpful.1 0
In addition to this, text writers suggest the inclusion of presumption of
survivorship clauses in wills with no hesitancy."1
5.
6.

Internal Revenue Reglations § 20.2056(e) -I- (e).
Vyo. Stat. 0 34-104 (1957).

7. Wyo. Stat. § 34.101 (1957).
8.

9.
10.
11.

In re Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611

Uniform Simultaneous
Uniform Simultaneous
missioners on Uniform
Bowe, Estate Planning

(1918).

Death Act, § 6, 9C U.L.A. (1957).
Death Act. Handbook of the National Conference of ComState Laws and Proceedings, 252 (1953).
and Taxation, 62, 160-163 (1957).

NOTES

Having advanced the supposition that under the statutes effective
within this jurisdiction a presumption of survivorship in a decendent's
will is effective, the next step is to see if it will be effective in the narrow
question of producing the desired result in rclation to joint tenancies and
tenancies by the entireties.
At this point the whole problem is a result of the nature of joint
tenancies and tenancies by the entireties. A presumption of survivorship
clause in a will would naturally be supposed to affect only that property
passing by the will. However, the jointly owned property does not pass
by the will and any will provision which attempts to affect it is usually
held to be invalid. 12 This is usually based on the theory that when the
will operates at the death of the testator, he has no interest in the jointly
owned property, it having passed on his death to the survivor.' 3 It must
be borne in mind that the reported cases holding that will provisions which
attempt to affect joint property are invalid concern an attempt to adversely
affect someone else's interest. These cases are indicative of the form
which presumptions of survivorship which attempt to affect joint property
must take. A presumption of survivorship clause which is in favor of
the testator and attempts to appropriate all of the joint property to his
own estate would probably be invalid. The presumption would then of
necessity have to be in favor of the other joint owner. In the case of
husband and wife the presumption would usually-be in the husband's will
providing a presumption of his wife's survivorship. Additional provision
could be made in the wife's will presuming her own survivorship but in
the light of the above it is difficult to see how this would be of any aid in
obtaining the desired effect. A presumption of survivorship in the testator's will in favor of the other joint owner does not adversely affect the
other joint owner's interest. Unlike the usual situation in which the jointly
owned property all passes to the surviving joint tenant upon the death of the
other, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act would cause half of the joint
property to be included in the estate of the testator. It is this property
which would be affected by holding the presumption valid. Validity of
the presumption would not interfere with the basic survivorship feature
of joint ownership. The only purpose of such a presumption is to fill the
void caused by lack of evidence as to who actually survived. 14 The result
of the presumption would be to prevent one-half of the joint property
from vesting in his estate under the provisions of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act. It is on this point that any distinction must be based. Although
there is no authority on this precise point, because of this distinction a
court should give effect to the presumption since the cardinal rule in the
construction of wills is to give effect to the testator's wishes if they are
clearly ascertainable from the will and not contrary to law or public
policy. 15 As is seen by the above construction of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act permitting presumption of survivorship clauses in general and
12.
13.
14.

In re Melcher's Will, 246 Wis. 45, 16 N.W.2d 373 (1944).
In re Kaspari's Estate, .. N.D. , 71 N.W.2d 558 (1955).
31 C.J.S. 723, Evidence, § 114 (1940).

15.

95 C.J.S. 731, Wills, § 590 (1940).
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from the nature of the testator's interest, such a provisiion should operate

to produce the" desired effect. While it is necessary to tile establishment
of survivorship in this manner that the will be probated, the general
purpose is accomplished in regard to savings on administration and for
purposes of utili7ing the marital deduction.

The one remaining point

would be to draft a presumption of surviorship clause which is sufficiently
specific that a court would have no doubt as to the testator's* intention.
In the light of the above it would seem that despite the provisions of
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and the nature of joint tenancies
and tenancies by the entireties, a presupnltion of survivorship clause in a
will presuming the survival of the other joint owner to have survived
would operate to place all of such property in one estate.
GEORGE L.

ZIMMERS

EMPLOYEE LIFE INSURANCE FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYER
AS MITIGATING DAMAGES AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
IN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
At the outset, it should be noted that the subject discussed by this
paper, as reflected by the title, concerns the effect, if any, life insurance
proceeds may 'have upon the ascertainment of damages in an action for
wrongful death. Because of the very strong weight of authority in the
United States to the effect that such proceeds may not be considered to
mitigate damages in a death action by recipients thereof,1 this discussion
concerns only a very narrow possible exception to this general rule.
Since any exception to a general rule must logically circumvent the
reasons therefor, these reasons should be considered. The stated reasoning
behind the general rule is that since the party effectuating the insurance
policy had paid in consideration the full value of the premiums for compelte protection under the policy, there cannot be any equity in the
claim of a defendant in the contract for which he has no concern or gave
no consideration.2 It must be conceded that in most cases it is a sound
underlying policy that wrongdoers should not be protected to the extentthat an untimely death has been contemplated by the decedent and provided for by a separate contract of insurance, however, the situation to
which the possible exception would be applicable, simply stated, would
arise in the case when the wrongdoer, who is a defendant in an action for
wrongful death, has furnished the consideration for the life insurance
policy. At this point it can be seen that the reasons for the rule, as stated
above, fail to be appropriate.
1.
2.

Brabham -. Baltimore and 0. R. Co. (C.C.-5. 4th).
v. Ft. Branch, 204 Int. 152, 178 N.E. 4.10. 82 A., .R.
A.L.R. 686, s. 95 AL.R. 579 (1935).
Baltimore and 0. R. Co. v. ,Vightman. 29 Graft. (Va.)
reversed on other grounds in 104
.S. :5. 26 L.Ed. (43

220 F. 35 (1914); Thompson
1413 (1931); Annotation: 18
431. 26 Am. Rep. 384 (1877),
(1877).

